Understanding the Cultural Trauma behind Identity Politics, Creating a Third Space in the Middle of Polarity

Ken Miryam Vivekananda¹, Tommy Christommy²
Universitas Indonesia

Abstract

To anticipate the eternal polarization in the 2024 election, this study uses a critical perspective to trace the upstream of the problem of identity politics in Indonesia. By using digital ethnography methods, this study explores various narratives of cultural trauma that often circulate in the midst of election momentum as the root of the problem of identity politics. In this study, the psycho-social paradigm is used to read various narratives in Twitter conversations as a response to cultural trauma against social bodies that resist. By using a conceptual framework related to the process of forming a third space through digital media, this study offers a form of cultural trauma coping in a divided society.

Keywords: Cultural Trauma, Identity Politics, Polarization, Digital Media, Third Space

1. INTRODUCTION

History records that the various ideological spectrums are very colorful in an entity as diverse as Indonesia. In Indonesia, the propaganda machine as the driving force behind the factories of various ideologies incessantly works with media formats that continue to change over time. In the midst of today's digital sphere, the mechanical movements of ideological factories are increasingly producing waste in the form of digital pollution consisting of disinformation, misinformation, hate speech, slander and fake news. It's all like carbon dioxide poison that is exhaled from cyberspace or cyberspace, but the smoke spreads so that it can obscure the view in the real world. That kind of smoke will not be easily extinguished as long as the fire never dies right at the wick.

In the wilderness of democracy, accurate information that can freely circulate functions like oxygen. Only armed with oxygen can digital public spaces become healthy public spaces. There citizens can navigate political decisions to improve their quality of life. In the context of making political decisions, the existence of a healthy digital public space in the midst of holding elections, especially the 2024 election, plays a significant role.

Since 2014, the digital world has colored the election momentum with the formation of identity politics that has hardened in the poles of polarization. The existence of digital crowds created in pockets of algorithms or algorithmic enclaves (Lim, 2017) which are...
polar-opposite is increasingly sharpening this polarization. In the Jakarta Arts Council's cultural speech book (2021) Lim wrote the definition of algorithmic enclaves as 'algorithmic enclaves that form when a group of individuals driven by continuous interactions with algorithms and among themselves, attempt to form a shared online identity to defend their beliefs and protect their resources from threats, both real and majestic; usually from a common (perceived) enemy.' Lim gave an example of these algorithmic pockets more concretely in the emergence of the polarization of 'tadpole' versus 'campret' in the 2019 presidential election discourse on social media. This polarization has triggered ancient instincts that prioritize emotions over thinking capacity. The most banal polarizations are of course recorded in collective memory whose traces appear tick-swimmers on stigma, labeling, and stereotypical attributions such as 'cebong', 'kampret', 'kadrun', or 'buzzer.'

The existence of aggressive buzzers from both sides is one of the inevitable side effects of identity politics. Sugiono's (2020) study states that Indonesian buzzers have a tendency to publish false and dis informative content by using fake accounts. These pseudonymous accounts are operated by large numbers of people and robots to create a competitive trend on social media.

This condition can be referred to what Tilly (2001) calls 'politics of contention' to show the contention of narrative and identity contestation. In hostile politics, tactics and strategies are carried out with a 'feuding repertoire.' The success of this repertoire can take two possible routes; will voters change their electoral choices because they find a party that is close to their political preferences or will the party change voters' minds about past conflicts?

In their repertoire of practices, politicians are fully aware of the importance of the political framework in mobilizing historical memory in the past. These references to the past do not always take the form of nostalgia, but can also refer to antagonistic aspects about who is to blame for traumatic historical events. Calls to remember collective violence in the past become a political force to mobilize support and demonize political opponents as dangerous parties who are assumed to be likely to "repeat history."

Kubik and Bernhard (2014: 4) embed the term 'mnemonic soldier'; to refer to political actors who treat history in this instrumental way. Mnemonic warriors construct visions of the past to legitimize their efforts to gain or maintain power. This mnemonic soldier draws a sharp imaginary line between those who are claimed to be "straighter of history" and political opponents who have been considered to be "turners of history" (Kubik and Bernhard, 2014: 17).

What these 'mnemonic soldiers' do is actually closely related to the conceptual framework of 'cultural trauma' from Khadem (2014). Khadem defines cultural trauma as a 'communal practice of historical hermeneutics.' This means that, like a river that flows with a reverse current, cultural trauma works based on interpretations of events in the past. This interpretation occurs based on the representation of collective memory which is nothing more than an image of an event that is interpreted together by a communal unit, thereby creating a collective identity. Several previous studies have confirmed the existence of a relationship between cultural trauma and collective identity construction. This is explored in the studies of Heryanto (2018), Appadurai (2019), Sütterlin (2020), and Meretoja (2020).

In 2021, studies related to this matter will be increasingly discussed, as can be read in the study by Adji & Polain (2021), Al Azmeh, et al (2021), Liu (2021), Leese, et al (2021), Simon (2021), and Wicaksono (2021).

In the context of constructing Indonesian identity as a national identity, Heryanto (2018) observed that in an effort to construct its national identity, Indonesia is always trapped in the tension of forgetting or remembering a traumatic event in the past. In fact, the matter of healing cultural trauma is not a matter of remembering or forgetting. It is more about how the state provides a safe space to be able to discuss collective wounds openly in the balance.
of justice. Openness to heal the wounds of cultural trauma should be sought, because it is impossible for a nation to heal collective wounds that it does not recognize. In the context of holding elections, recognition of cultural trauma should be a shared urgency in order to anticipate the eternal cycle of violence (verbal and physical) from identity politics that leaves scars without ever being talked about.

Due to the lack of space for a process of coming to terms with the multiple burdens of the past, cultural trauma from the memory of violence after violence will always be responded to frontally at every election moment. The collective memory of past violence is often played as a strategy to mobilize votes during elections through identity politics.

The term ‘identity politics’ was actually first coined by the Combahee River Collective (CRC), a radical black feminist collective founded in 1974 in Boston, United States. In Collective, C. R. (1977) stated that, “We realize the only party who cares enough about us to work consistently for our freedom is none other than ourselves.” The CRC further said, “focusing on our own oppression must be realized in the concept of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics is one that is rooted in our own identity, as opposed to seeking to end the oppression of others.”

To pursue the upstream problem of identity politics in the context of elections in Indonesia, a critical perspective is needed. Therefore, this study aims to fill the gap in research on this critical perspective. By exploring various narratives of cultural trauma that often circulate amidst election momentum, the psycho-social paradigm will be used to read responses to cultural trauma as the root of the problem of identity politics in Indonesia. Cultural trauma responses that have been unwittingly inherited between generations have so far been overlooked as the focus of various conflict management efforts; especially conflicts that arise in the middle of elections. The lack of discussion regarding cultural trauma means that the fire of conflict never dies right at the fuse. By using a conceptual framework related to the process of creating a third space through digital media, this study offers a form of effort to heal cultural trauma in a divided society. This third space will be able to open a conflict management roadmap for holding elections that no longer fracture, but rather strengthen social cohesion between citizens and countries.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

This research was conducted using digital ethnographic methods. Digital ethnography is a method of exploring and investigating individual or group behavior in the realm of technology, developed from the diffusion of digital technology which is increasingly close to everyday life through smartphones and social media (Hine, 2000). By using digital ethnographic methods, the author attempts to explore various narratives of cultural trauma that often circulate amidst election momentum as the root of the identity politics problem.

In this study, the psycho-social paradigm is used to read various narratives in Twitter conversations as a response to cultural trauma from social bodies that resist.

For this reason, this study attempts to use a qualitative approach to analyze a corpus of text data in the form of cultural trauma narratives circulating on the Twitter platform. This study uses a critical paradigm to see how discourse is produced, understood and interpreted in a particular context. This study is very aware that there is no discourse that is devoid of context. For this reason, lingual features such as lexical processes and meaning relations in the text are analyzed to always link them to the context.

As digital ethnographic research, this research is more oriented towards content analysis and discourse framing. The digital ethnographic approach in this study emphasizes the field research aspect by placing the social media arena as an arena for continuous circulation of discourse in intense social interaction between various individuals and groups.
The data collection method in this research was carried out by documenting tweets, retweets and quote tweets related to identity politics and collective memory. In contrast to ethnographic studies in general, digital ethnography has challenges in that the amount of data available is very large, therefore this study will use a purposive sampling technique in selecting the data used as analysis material by considering the number of engagements (likes, replies, retweets) and availability of supporting media (images, videos and links). Criterion sampling allows researchers to determine the characteristics on which to base the selection of research participants – important when participants must be able to access and use particular social media for research (Salmons, 2017).

This study will focus on interpreting the meaning of identity politics which includes aspects of cultural trauma response on the Twitter platform. Consideration of this is related to the nature of cultural trauma memory which works based on today's meaning of past events. For this reason, the discussion will be more relevant and substantive if it is carried out at the level of meaning of identity politics as a marker of cultural trauma response. From this it will be illustrated that the cultural trauma response is something that is inter-generational and capable of transmission across space and time.

This study will specialize in the presence of digital media space as a third space. This third space allows the emergence of a public space that can mediate between individuals and their communities in various spectrums. In this way, this study will contribute to providing a rereading of the contribution of third space amidst polarization ahead of the 2024 election, where multi-party parties can listen to each other's stories to embrace a fractured past.

3. RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Unquenchable Flame of Polarization

On March 19, 2023, the University of Indonesia Psychology Laboratory has released the results of two studies done to test whether political polarization really occurs in Indonesia. The first study is an analysis of social media data on 43 million tweets before, during and after the 2019 presidential election. The second study is a public opinion survey conducted from 6 February to 28 February 2023. This study aims to see whether there is a residue of polarization that was previously only identified in the online world during the 2019 presidential election are still confirmed in the form of attitudes, feelings and opinions in offline contexts three years after the presidential election. The analysis was carried out using the Social Network Analysis (SNA) method on 43 million Twitter accounts with the hashtags #2019 presidential election, #2019gantipresiden, and #2019tetapjokowi. From this data, a pattern of polarization between the two political poles was found (modularity index -0.34).

More analysis was carried out using the topic modeling method to capture conversation patterns based on the issues and political actors (user accounts) that are followed. From the conversation pattern, divisions between followers appear based on the dimension of religious ideology. The two poles are divided into the secular pole and the fundamentalist pole.

The implication of this finding is: polarization with a religious narrative framework has social implications which, if not handled properly, can be counterproductive. Research also finds indications of the implications of this polarization consequential on affection (feelings). Both clusters tend to develop negative emotions (fear, threat, dislike, disrespect) towards groups that are not "of the same faith" (in the context of support during the 2019 presidential election).

In the mid-2010s, there were indeed widespread studies on the various negative implications of digital platforms. Scholars argue that social media has shifted from a platform for civic activism and a force for freedom and democracy to one of increasing
deception and manipulation as it facilitates the proliferation of disinformation and fake news (Sinpeng and Tapsell, 2020), aiding the spread of hate speech and discriminatory messages (Kyaw, 2021), adding populist and extremist voices (Estella, 2021), and exacerbating societal polarization (Sunstein, 2018).

Several previous studies also stated that since the late 1990s, digital platforms have indeed been used to spread sectarian messages and mobilize hatred (Briëchler 2003; Lim 2005 2008). More than two decades since the arrival of the internet in Southeast Asia, the online population has not only grown exponentially. On the other hand, the capacity of governments to control technology and the digital space itself has become highly commercialized and increasingly algorithmic.

In this digital atmosphere, activists around the world must continually adapt and readjust digital media to suit their agendas. In Myanmar, since 2012, Facebook has become fertile ground for Buddhist ultranationalists who exploit algorithmic politics to mobilize anti-Muslim sentiment (Rio, 2021). Clearly, this movement existed before the era of social media. However, Facebook has made it easier for movements to mobilize anti-Muslim rhetoric, often using extreme speech and disinformation. Not only does Facebook allow extreme speech targeting the Rohingya, but algorithmic dynamics have also increased its visibility. By using hyper nationalistic narratives that frame Muslims as unpatriotic, an imminent threat to the Buddhist majority, and even terrorists, ultranationalists have reinforced existing divisions and anti-Muslim sentiment within Burmese society. In Thailand, algorithmic politics is further strengthening polarization on the ground. Importantly, digital media, especially social media and its algorithms, were not designed for democratic political purposes.

**Reading Algorithmic Political Rhythms**

The incorporation of social media into politics has resulted in what Lim (2020) calls algorithmic politics, or politics that centers its modus operandi on algorithmic maneuvering of issues with the core goal of dominating the media space to direct public opinion. The concept of algorithmic politics emerged when political actors saw the possibility of manipulating algorithms to influence citizens' political choices, especially during elections.

Beyond electoral politics, social media's algorithmic bias and the primacy of algorithmic politics also influence how citizens associate and engage collectively with one another. They facilitate the emergence of algorithmic enclaves as a discursive arena in which individuals, informed by their constant interaction with algorithms, interact with each other and gather based on a shared, perceived identity online to defend their beliefs and protect their resources from real and perceived threats perceived, usually allies of a common enemy (Lim 2020: 194).

Such enclaves confine groups of users in echo chambers of shared identities and perceived threats, resulting in various forms of tribal nationalism in which social media users claim and legitimize their own version of nationalism to the exclusion of equality and justice for others (Lim 2017: 444).

For almost every political issue, algorithmic dynamics create binary votes thereby making the voice of the 'Other' sound worse. So it's not visible. These dynamics make it difficult for civil society to mobilize on complex issues such as human rights, justice, or gender equality. In contrast, for mnemonic warriors, especially those who use fundamentalist or extremist rhetoric, the algorithm environment of social media offers fertile ground for mobilizing support.

From Joko Widodo's (aka Jokowi) meteoric rise from mayor of Solo to his victory in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, to Duterte's success in the 2016 Philippine
presidential election, we have witnessed the role of the social media campaign industry and the prevalence of algorithmic politics. It cannot be denied that grassroots activism strengthened Jokowi’s campaign, including by progressive activists and civil society groups. However, the campaign actually centered on the work of professional marketing strategies to build his persona, branding him as an ‘anti-corruption outsider’ and ‘ordinary people’. Both Jokowi, a centrist, technocratic populist (Postill, 2018), and his rival, the oligarchic populist Prabowo (Aspinall, 2015), both adhere to algorithmic politics.

Their campaigns use cyber trolls, buzzers (paid campaigners), and online celebrity ties. Beyond elections, these practices further polarize and deepen divisions in the country; almost every issue is framed per anti- or pro-Jokowi sentiment. Therefore, right-wing political actors continue to exploit anti-Jokowi sentiment to further their agenda. Conversely, any criticism of the government, including problematic policies and regulations, risks being branded as anti-Jokowi, leaving little room for progressive and pro-justice voices.

The narratives that resonate from this period show that social media, like the internet in its early days, can serve activism; both democratic and fascist. However, social media, especially through algorithms that prioritize popularity over content quality, reinforces the tendency for simplified, dramatic, or sensational narratives. In this way, the issues raised can become very visible so that the binary populist framing will always win; topped trending.

On the other hand, activists and civil society groups are also trying to use the combined capabilities of social media and algorithms to rally the masses against undemocratic governments or other undemocratic actors, who are often framed as enemies of the people. However, undemocratic and fascist elements can equally use this tool to advance their agenda, in particular to mobilize hostility against the ‘Other’.

Cultural Trauma behind Polarization and Algorithmic Bias

In the last decade, social media has become more algorithmic, which has implications for civil society activism and politics in general. Designed primarily to drive revenue focused on targeted advertising, social media algorithms are not neutral. Instead, they are biased towards superlative content, which tends to generate extreme reactions (Lim 2020).

With increasing voice suppression and algorithmic bias, it is not easy for digital literacy activism to penetrate the social media environment. Lim's (2013) research in Indonesia, with some relevance elsewhere, has shown that the success of mobilization on social media depends on a constellation of several factors. Issues that are more likely to go viral and translate into mass activism encapsulate simple/modest narratives, involve low-risk activities, fit dominant metanarratives, and are uncontested by powerful competing narratives in the larger media environment (Lim 2013).

In this environment, reductionist narratives, such as issues that are inherently populist or strategically mobilized using populist framing, penetrate networks more easily. Such algorithms can also limit and manipulate political participation. This kind of algorithm pocket has the potential to be instrumental in identity politics; a political practice that is actually rooted in cross-generational cultural trauma that has been silenced and uncommunicated.

In terms of silencing cultural trauma narratives, Adji & Polain (2021) has suggested that in the context of decolonization in a nation building process, Indonesia should be able to more honestly acknowledge forms of violence in the past; no matter how bitter and complex it is. This confirms important findings from many studies which state that the inheritance of cultural trauma narratives that are not communicated in a dialogical atmosphere has the potential to create a cycle of violence that has an impact on the positioning of national

In the narrative traffic on the Twitter platform, it is very possible for narrative elements to occur which in Soja's conceptual framework is referred to as 'third space'. The intersection of ideas can superficially be interpreted as a potential conflict, but can also be interpreted deeply as a synthetic condition of polarities previously thought to be opposites. This means that strengthening integration through conflict discourse is actually something that is very possible to do on the Twitter platform.

This study found that on the Twitter platform, identity political contestation that occurs in Indonesia tends to be religious, ethnic and political ideological in nature. The Republic of South Maluku (RMS), the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), and the Free Papua Organization (OPM) represent forms of political struggle that utilize ethnic identity as a response from social bodies that fight against perceived injustices committed by the state. Apart from that, there is also the Darul Islam (DI) movement spread from West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi, which uses religious identity as a political struggle. On the other hand, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) rebellion in 1948 and 1965 also campaigned for Marxism and communism as ideologies of struggle. The identity politics that fuel these movements are often influenced by transnational activism or receive inspiration and support from groups in other countries.

On the other hand, Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Polarization politics based on religious identity has resulted in Islamic groups becoming main highlight. The research results show that this figuration that confirms the binary structure in discussions of identity politics can be explained through Juhasz's (2012) study which states that Twitter is the site with the largest number of offensive comments, so it often triggers sharp conversational polarization. In Juhasz's study, participant anonymity was said to be a determining factor in the prevalence of offensive comments within a contour of polarization.

In general, the term polarization is actually used to express a political spectrum that has a span of ideological distance. Referring to Sunstein's (2007) law of group polarization, it is stated that the polarization mechanism will work like molecules moving towards two poles; where group members will move more in harmony in the direction they were heading previously. This mechanism is also confirmed in the data.

Digital space is often assumed to be an arena for the politics of recognition; a relational space between the other and the central. Lim (2012) calls them informational terrains of identity and power. Optimistically, Lim sees this as an opportunity to realize democracy, autonomy and respect for differences. These three things are certainly a manifestation of hope in utilizing the third space in every election, including the 2024 election which is approaching.

However, the findings from this study confirm that the sharp polarization in election momentum is actually mediated by digital media itself. In this study, the Twitter platform is the main focus. Algorithmic pockets formed from the Twitter automation system have created a crucible of hatred and fanaticism towards the figure of the candidate who is used as a representation of two competing ideologies.

In the midst of election momentum, responses to cultural trauma play a significant role in producing pockets of algorithms in various loci in the digital realm. Twitter is just one of them. Twitter is a microblogging site, where users can participate in active conversations regarding social and political topics, including the collective wounds of cultural trauma.
articulated through various narratives. Individuals not only absorb information but also provide information.

The formation of this algorithmic pocket will certainly have an impact on the reconfiguration of the inherited categories of social life around the power structure. On the other hand, these pockets of algorithms become chaotic digital networks that can be haggled and bargained over and possibly consolidated by the ruling class in the interests of capital (Zuboff, 2019).

Algorithmic pockets formed from responses to cultural trauma illustrate a 'digital diaspora' solidarity which in Gajjala's (2019) study is described as the formation of communities at the intersection of local and global, national and international, private and public, offline and online, or virtual and real. It is stated that in the digital diaspora there is discursive community formation with ambivalent encounters, namely between continuity and discontinuity, conjuncture and disjuncture, and often involving memories of the colonial era and postcolonial reality at the same time. This pattern of digital diaspora solidarity is what the author assumes to be the basis for the formation of a collective identity amidst the momentum of the election.

This study observes several agencies or mnemonic soldiers during the 2014 presidential election campaign that echoed attribution or labeling towards two poles. Call it the Twitter account @TM2000Back or Trio Macan which is the top cluster influencer counter-Jokowi as a representative of the Islamic group. This account raises the issue that Jokowi is a descendant of PKI sympathizers and is of Chinese descent to build the image that Jokowi is at odds with Islamic groups. In 2016, the Pro-Government cluster echoed the narrative "MCA created a hoax" so that the public would no longer believe it.

This study also looked at the labeling of groups of netizens with certain names starting with the nicknames "cebong", "kampret" "kadrun" or "buzzeRp". Various labels on Twitter due to sharp polarization or polarization between Islamic groups versus secular-nationalists are often considered as variables caused solely by electoral politics. Aspinall (2015) argues that this polarization has revived the Islamic ideological struggle that previously occurred during the elections year 1955.

However, this is actually rooted deep in long history. In the early days of the Republic of Indonesia's independence, Islamic groups created momentum independence as a starting point for reformulating Islamic doctrine which not only deals with practical political problems but also the essential problem of how to find the foundations of theology in the context of ideological thought. The orientation of Muslims in the political arena brought Muslims into a period of ideological thinking; a period where thinking developed regarding how to make Islam an alternative ideology for a country. This not only has implications for ideological struggle, but on the other hand also displays fundamentalist political expressions in various movements such as DI/TII Kartosuwiryo in West Java, Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi, and Daud Beureuh in Aceh.

The ideological dispute between Islamic groups and nationalist groups culminated in the Constituent Assembly in 1955-1959. The desire for political Islam in the Old Order era as stated in the 1959 Presidential Decree refers to the debate surrounding the implementation of the Jakarta Charter (22 June 1945). It is still vivid in the memory when Natsir wanted Islam to be the "bloodline" of this nation and state, but Soekarno instead declared "Islam Sontoloyo!". Natsir also gave a full argument against Islam and Independent Reason.

In the decades since, the internet has become a new locus for the revival of contestation over primordial and ethnoreligious identities, such as in the Maluku sectarian conflict in 1999–2002, where fighting broke out between Christians and Muslims and killed at least 500,000 people. In this conflict, for groups such as Laskar Jihad (Jihad Forces) and Laskar Christ (Soldiers of Christ), armed paramilitary groups claiming to represent Muslims and
Christians, the internet became the main propaganda tool and site for mobilizing hatred and violence. As a result, the internet has made it easier for these radical militia groups to expand their audience and reach resources; in doing so, they expanded the scale and scope of the battlefield (Lim 2002, 2005; Bräuchler 2003).

This phenomenon can be read through the conceptual framework of Fukuyama (2015) regarding 'thymos'. The concept of 'thymos' is an element of the human soul that is always thirsty for recognition and validation. This explains how humans often pursue their own or group identity, whether it is related to nationality, religion and various other collective units. This identity automatically creates social and cultural clusters. These contestations have the potential to lead to conflict that can lead to friction and even violent clashes. This kind of collision leaves social fractures or fissures in society, giving rise to various cultural trauma responses. These cracks then polarize to create polarization which is actually rooted in the formation of solidarity based on cultural trauma. In other words, it can be concluded that the thymos factor is an accelerator of polarization in society.

If we refer to the study by Smith and Watson (2010), there are three important elements in the process of forming solidarity based on cultural trauma, namely collective suffering, communal survival, and 3) political struggle. These elements are formed when a collective unit is identifying the causes of trauma and assuming a moral responsibility through collective solidarity. Several studies (Eyerman, 2019; Liu, 2021; Leese, et al., 2021; Rösli, 2021; Al Azmeh, et al., 2021; Heryanto, 2018) view that this aspect of the meaning of cultural trauma will always be constructed by subjectivities that contest.

Social Media as Third Space

In examining the polarization of issues in this research data, the author reads the visible binary patterns using Lim's (2020) conceptual framework regarding algorithmic enclaves. Lim explained that the digital sphere will tend to lead conversations in two large enclaves that are amplified based on the work of algorithmic machines. For this reason, Lim recommends being more observant in examining "ghetto" clusters of identity articulation instead of focusing on giant clusters that often appear to be in contention in cyberspace.

In the midst of giant polarized poles, further exploration of this ghetto cluster can be framed by Soja's concept of third space. Soja states that third space is a space of encounter between 'subjectivity and objectivity, the abstract and the concrete, the real and the imagined, the knowable and the unimaginable, the repetitive and the different, structure and agency, mind and body, consciousness and the unconscious.' In Soja's observations, third space is a dynamic process that will open up the possibility of socio-spatial dialectics in unlimited multiplicity.

In order to create a dialogical atmosphere in discussing cultural trauma, studies by Manca (2021) and Johanssen (2022) highlight that new media can be used as a tool to contest cultural trauma narratives. This contestation is offered by new media features that are more democratic and varied in conveying narratives of cultural trauma more effectively at the community level (Manca, 2021; Silvestri, 2018; Restrepo, 2018).

If studies by Lesse et al., (2021) and Oprea (2021) suggest optimizing language features in creating narratives of cultural trauma in new media, then studies by Liu (2021) and Santo (2022) look more at the features of technological innovation in creating arenas or 'trauma'-scape in new media for the process of making meaning of trauma in everyday life. The focus of this study on technological innovation is also a point of emphasis for Manca's research (2021), which specifically looks at how the virtual world cannot be separated from the reality of convergence. This variety of content in the convergence of new media has become possible for the younger generation to produce and consume.
The dominance of audio-visual culture presented by the convergence of new media can ultimately change the perception of memory or trauma among the younger generation. This change in perception has the potential to create a wave of transformative movement as stated by Adji and Polain (2021). In this study, data is presented on how new media succeeded in opening channels for discursive conversation about the cultural trauma of the 1998 violence and succeeded in transmitting memories in the context of imagination and empathy whose resonance transcends space and time. Through new media, narratives of cultural trauma that originate at the grassroots can finally be more channelized to create discursive and transformative momentum in a nation-building process (Adji and Polain, 2021; Al Azmeh, et al., 2021; Leese, et al., 2021; Liu, 2021; Manca; 2021; Marjanovic, 2020).

On the one hand, social media provides a space for civil society groups and activists to communicate and interact with each other, form association networks, distribute content, and mobilize mass activism. On the other hand, social media networks are vast, content is abundant, attention spans are short, and conversations are broken down into small sentences (Lim 2013, 644). In this environment, civil society must work against 'vote shrinking' (Lim 2013, 651) and algorithmic biases that privilege extreme content that is simple or simplified and triggers emotions (Lim 2020). During this period, civil society activism has worked amidst the rise of algorithmic politics, characterized by the rise of binary populist frameworks and algorithmic enclaves that are largely unfavorable to civil society freedoms and democracy. Additionally, civil society must also operate against increasing state control and surveillance.

The mobilization of votes through identity politics and its relationship to cultural trauma narratives during election momentum is certainly not a unique Indonesian phenomenon. This can easily be read in the context of the Italian election when Berlusconi constructed the myth of anti-communism in the nation-building process; or the narration of the Ottoman revival in Erdogan's campaign in Turkey, as well as the slogan 'Make America Great Again'; from Trump. These phenomena show that cultural trauma narratives are closely related to collective memory, nostalgia and historical romance (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Betz and Johnson, 2004). Related to this, studies on the impact of a traumatic past on voting were also discussed by Wittenberg (2006), Tilley and Evans (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2011), Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017), Hoerner, Jaax, and Rodon (2019), Haffert (2021); and Raimundo et al. (2021).

This kind of relationship between cultural trauma and election momentum is actually vulnerable to being triggered by people's pessimism (Steenvoorden and Harteveld, 2018) regarding opportunities for change in actual conditions that are considered unfavorable. This pessimism is responded to psychologically by fleeing into nostalgia (De Vries and Hoffmann, 2018).

In this study, the author reads the escapist condition as a 'flight' response (flight/avoid); one of the natural responses in trauma studies. The author based the categorization of cultural trauma responses on Donahue's (2020) study. Donahue divides cultural trauma responses into three categories, namely 1) freeze, 2) flight (avoid), and 3) fight (against). In this study, the author reads these three responses as: 1) a social body that freezes, 2) a social body that avoids, and 3) a social body that resists.

4. CONCLUSION

The author concludes that the social body's response of freezing, avoiding or fighting along with its derivative symptoms can actually be linked to the three elements that form cultural trauma from Smith and Watson (2010), namely: collective suffering, communal survival. ), and political struggle (politicized struggle). Through these three elements, this study finds that narratives of cultural trauma related to the meaning of identity politics...
echoed through new media have the potential to change the identity of nationalists and Islamists. If the reality of cultural trauma and algorithmic polarization has been considered debilitating, then the practice of digital media in creating a third space becomes a form of digital activism that is empowering and restorative. In digital media, cultural trauma wounds have been transformed into a form of cultural power. Digital media can be a third space that offers a configuration of Indonesian and Islam in a more humane and harmonious construction in the midst of a crisis.

In the future, more elaborative steps are needed from day to day to recommend how new media can be optimized as a discursive space and liberate arena in communicating all forms of cultural trauma in different contexts in Indonesia. The canalization of somatic energy from cultural trauma through community media will open up discursive momentum to discuss the positioning of cultural identity in the long journey of nation-building for a political entity called Indonesia. The large number of cultural trauma wounds in Indonesia no longer need to be seen as an obstacle, because this study has explored that where there are cultural trauma wounds, there is also the potential for cultural power.

The function of social media as a third space that is able to unite and not divide society certainly needs to be optimized with adequate driving tools. If election conflict management strategies have often been formulated only using a legal approach within the power structure, there are cultural and psycho-social aspects that need to be taken into account when formulating strategies to avoid, resolve and mitigate conflicts due to sharp polarization. For example, training and digital media moderation practices are needed so that users are able to implement tactics and methods of channeling trauma in a dialogue manner. The hope is that the practice of social media moderation as a third space in the future can open up opportunities to increase the effectiveness of electoral conflict management which is often triggered by contestation of cultural trauma narratives. Only by mutually recognizing and understanding the wounds of cultural trauma in the third space is it possible for the fire of conflict to be extinguished right at the fuse.

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