Corruption Cases in Government Institutions: Abuse of Rules from the Perspective of Weber and Wilson's Theory

Abstract

This study examines the phenomenon of corruption in Indonesian government institutions through the theoretical perspectives of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson. Corruption cases are viewed not only as individual actions, but also as the result of structural and cultural weaknesses in government bureaucracy. Using qualitative research methods based on literature studies, this study analyzes the abuse of rules (rule manipulation) in the public administration system that should be rational and legal, but is instead used for personal or group interests. From Weber's perspective, the ideal rational-legal bureaucracy aims to create efficiency and legal certainty. However, in practice, the bureaucracy in Indonesia is often too rigid and formalistic, thus obscuring moral values and the purpose of public service. This opens up opportunities for deviation and corruption that are legitimized by formal procedures. Meanwhile, Wilson's theory highlights the importance of separating the political and administrative realms and the need for flexibility in public service. The inability of the apparatus to maintain professionalism and neutrality from political intervention is one of the factors driving the emergence of bureaucratic corruption. The results of the study indicate that corruption in government institutions is the result of an imbalance between compliance with rules (rule-based system) and the application of public service ethics (value-based administration). The synthesis of Weber's and Wilson's theories asserts that overly formal bureaucracies devoid of moral values, as well as overly flexible bureaucracies lacking regulatory control, both create space for abuse of power. Therefore, bureaucratic reform must be directed at striking a balance between legal rationality and administrative ethical integrity to prevent corruption sustainably.